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By Democratic Audit
The UK could take some lessons from Australia on fixed terms
for party leaders so that election winners are guaranteed a full
term in office
The Australian Labor Party has approved proposals from the party’s new leader Kevin Rudd, that the party’s
leadership selection rules be changed so that parliamentarians and party members are able to elect party
leaders. Anika Gauja writes that the UK’s political parties could consider another aspect of the reforms that
ensure party leaders cannot be removed if they have won an election, unless it is demanded by 60% of the
party. This would increase the public legitimacy of elected leaders and help to create greater party stability.
Polit ical
parties in
the United
Kingdom
broadened
their
leadership
selection
processes
to include
party
members
more than a
decade
ago. Now
the
Australian
Labor Party
(ALP) has
taken the
opportunity
to become
the f irst of
Australia’s
major parties to f ollow this trend.
The polit ics of  leadership in Australia have been described as Darwinian, and recent events have been no
exception. On 28th June, Kevin Rudd replaced Julia Gillard as Labor Party leader and Prime Minister of
Australia. Rudd was elected by the Labor Caucus 57 votes to Gillard’s 45, three years af ter he originally
resigned the posts.
Irrespective of , and perhaps detracting f rom any policy successes she achieved, the duration of  Gillard’s
leadership of  the party (June 2010-2013) was marred by the ghost of  Rudd. From the moment that she
became prime minister, the legit imacy of  Gillard’s leadership was brought into question by the manner in
which she was installed. The f luidity of  leadership removal and selection rules in the party (requiring only a
majority vote of  the parliamentary party to remove and install a leader at any time) meant that Australians
f ound they suddenly had a new Prime Minister, despite not having the opportunity to go to the polls.
Kevin Rudd’s proposals that Labor leadership selection rules be changed so that both parliamentarians and
party members elect the party leader were approved by a special meeting of  the Labor parliamentary party.
Under the new selection rules, the vote will be split equally between the two groups. A leader who takes the
party to an election and wins would be guaranteed a f ull term in of f ice – a provision that Rudd has argued
is necessary because “today, more than ever, Australians demand to know that the prime minister they elect is
the prime minister they get.”
The timing of  these proposals should not come as a great surprise. Although Kevin Rudd is correct to say
that this is “the most significant reform to the Australian Labor Party in recent history,”  it  comes a time when
the party has been plagued by internal unrest and allegations of  corruption at both state and f ederal levels.
In this sense it is easy to appreciate the rhetoric of  ref orm and democratisation that is associated with the
change; three weeks ago Rudd stated: “I believe it will encourage people to re-engage in the political process
and bring back those supporters who have been disillusioned.” The ref orms would also “ensure that power
will never again rest in the hands of a factional few.”
Yet at the same time these changes also ref lect where Kevin Rudd’s power base lies: with the party
membership. While his leadership style was strongly crit icised by his Caucus colleagues, Rudd’s popularity
amongst the party membership has remained strong. Whilst not widely publicised, the election of  the party
leader by the membership was an idea that Rudd advocated at the party’s last National Conf erence in
December 2011.
With the approval of  these ref orms, the Labor Party is the f irst of  any Australian party since the Australian
Democrats to allow party members to elect the party leader. The Liberal Party, the National Party and the
Greens all continue to elect their party leaders through the parliamentary party and seem unlikely to change.
In international perspective, Australian parties have been rather unique in their unwillingness to move
inf luence beyond the parliamentary party, when comparable parties in Canada and the United Kingdom
incorporated a membership ballot into the process some time ago.
Unlike the Australian Democrats, however, the ALP vote will be shared between the national membership
and the f ederal parliamentary party. What is still to be worked out is where the unions f it in this picture. The
ALP may want to consider the UK Labour Party model, in which the leadership vote is split equally between
parliamentarians, party members and the unions. However, this may be set to change with the Refounding
Labour ref orms endorsed at last year ’s autumn conf erence indicating that Labour’s leadership f ranchise
might also be widened to party supporters. Automatic union af f iliation may now also be a thing of  the past,
with Ed Miliband seeking to implement measures that will see union members af f iliate voluntarily as
individuals with the party. This may, in turn, precipitate a restructure in the leadership f ranchise to either
remove (or drastically reduce) the union bloc vote.
What now sets the ALP apart is the provision that a successf ul leader (that is, a Prime Minister) may not be
removed between elections unless demanded by 60 per cent of  the party room. Rudd’s threshold originally
stood at 75 per cent, but this was reduced to 60 per cent as a concession to parliamentarians who believed
that the parliamentary party was giving too much of  its power away.
While this requirement may address some of  the problems of  uncertainty and public legit imacy that have
plagued Labor in recent years as a result of  f requent leadership challenges, it removes a great deal of  the
f lexibility that any party has to remove electorally unpopular leaders, or at least threaten to do so. It also
enhances the power of  the prime minister, as the manager of  her or his government, by curtailing the ability
of  parliamentarians to replace their leader.
Fixed term leadership in government is certainly an option f or polit ical parties in the UK to consider.
Currently the Conservatives and Labour only impose f ixed terms on those leaders who are in opposition,
operating as a stick to keep leaders on their toes. The ALP proposal essential reverses this expectation –
insulating and rewarding successf ul leaders f rom f uture challenges.
The primary benef it would be in addressing perceptions of  public legit imacy by ensuring that voters (by way
of  a general election) f eel that they have sanctioned the process. To the extent that the ref orms might also
create greater stability within a party, their electoral impact should also be posit ive. However, these benef its
need to be considered against the possibility of  a leader who just doesn’t perf orm – either with the public,
or their colleagues.
Changing the f ormal rules f or selecting a party leader is one thing; but it will do litt le stop resignations that
occur under pressure f rom colleagues or the party. Supporters of  alternate candidates could still run very
public, and potentially destabilising, campaigns calling f or the resignation of  their leader. It is hard to see
how these ref orms might have avoided the campaign f rom Gordon Brown’s supporters that eventually
persuaded Tony Blair to resign. Nor will they do anything to alleviate constant media attention upon the
(un)popularity of  party leaders and speculation about likely challengers.
Note: This post represents the views of the author, and not Democratic Audit, or the London School of
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